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The Inadequate Global Policy Response to 
Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights: 
Impact on Access to Medicines in Low- 
and Middle-Income Countries  
 
LISA FORMAN†  
Access to medicines in low- and middle-income countries is 
arguably one of the most explicit examples of how economic and trade 
rules can derogate from the rights to health and life protected in 
international human rights treaties.1 Despite multiple efforts to address 
access to medicines, material access gains outside of HIV/AIDS are so 
negligible as to suggest that the primary determinants of the drug gap 
are not being responded to. This article suggests that this lack of 
progress is partly a result of obstacles created by the World Trade 
Organization’s Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property2 (TRIPS Agreement) and the proliferating use of bilateral and 
free trade agreements (FTAs).3 In this light, the global drug gap 
provides a signal of the extent to which international actors are willing 
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 1.  See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, annex, International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, at 51 (Dec. 16, 1966) (recognizing “the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health” in Article 12); 
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, annex, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, at 53 
(Dec. 16, 1966) (recognizing the “inherent right to life” and associated rights in Article 6). 
 2.  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 3.  See infra Part II. 
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to give teeth to fundamental human rights like health when powerful 
commercial and trade interests point in other directions. This paper 
surveys this landscape, outlining the inaccessibility of essential 
medicines due to pricing, the impact of trade-related intellectual 
property rights on pricing, and the trade law and global health policy 
responses to the affordability and access challenges posed by 
intellectual property rights protections under the TRIPS Agreement 
and FTAs. It concludes that existing policy initiatives have failed to 
adequately respond to the impact of trade-related intellectual property 
rights on access to medicines, and that bolder measures are required, 
including suspending the application of trade-related intellectual 
property rights to essential drugs for low- and middle-income 
countries.  
I.  ACCESS TO MEDICINES AND PRICING  
The centrality of medicines to realizing human rights, 
development, and health system imperatives is illustrated in multiple 
domains: essential medicines are understood as a core obligation of 
states under the right to health,4 are recognized as a fundamental 
building block of health care systems capable of providing universal 
health coverage,5 and are included within global development policies 
like the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and Sustainable 
Development Goals.6  
Yet despite a plethora of international initiatives designed to 
improve access in low- and middle-income countries,7 two billion 
people still cannot access essential medicines,8 either because there are 
 
 4.  United Nations [U.N.] Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural 
Rights, General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health 
(Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights), U.N. 
Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000) [hereinafter General Comment No. 14]. 
 5.  See World Health Organization [WHO], Monitoring the Building Blocks of Health 
Systems: A Handbook of Indicators and Their Measurement Strategies, at vi, 59–69 (2010), 
http://www.who.int/healthinfo/systems/WHO_MBHSS_2010_full_web.pdf. 
 6.  Goal 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development, U.N., 
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/global.shtml (last visited Apr. 19, 2016); G.A. Res. 70/1, 
Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, at 16 (Sept. 25, 
2015). The Millennium Development Goals are development goals adopted globally in 2000 
to guide global development policy to 2015. Millennium Summit (6–8 September 2000), U.N., 
http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/millennium_summit.shtml (last visited Apr. 19, 
2016). The Sustainable Development Goals aim to replace the MDGs with a new fifteen year 
development agenda. G.A. Res. 70/1, supra, at 1. 
 7.  For example, the MDGs and the WHO Global Strategy and Plan of Action discussed 
below. See infra Part IV. 
 8.   WHO, WHO MEDICINES STRATEGY 2004–2007: COUNTRIES AT THE CORE, at 3, WHO 
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not enough drugs available in public health systems or because the 
drugs that are there or in the private sector are priced out of reach or 
not covered by health insurance.9 As a United Nations (U.N.) report 
monitoring compliance with the MDG on medicines illustrates that 
“essential medicines remain unaffordable and insufficiently available 
in developing countries.”10 This finding is reiterated in a 2015 report 
which found that “medicine availability is poor in many countries 
(particularly in the public sector), prices are high, and treatments, 
especially those for noncommunicable diseases, are unaffordable for 
those on low wages.”11 
Affordability is thus a key determinant of drug access, alongside 
rational selection and use; sustainable financing; and adequate 
infrastructure.12 However, the influence of affordability is amplified in 
low- and middle-income countries, where drugs are one of the largest 
out-of-pocket expenditures for the poor and one of the largest health 
care expenditures consuming anywhere from 25–70 percent of national 
health-care expenditures.13 Indeed, multiple studies confirm that low 
availability and unaffordable prices exacerbate illness and death and 
impoverish people.14 This situation leaves people to make terrible 
 
Doc. WHO/EDM/2004.5 (2004), http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/s5416e/s5416e.pdf. 
The WHO defines essential medicines as medicines “that satisfy the priority health care needs 
of the population. They are selected with due regard to public health relevance, evidence on 
efficacy and safety, and comparative cost-effectiveness.” Essential Medicines, WHO, 
http://www.who.int/topics/essential_medicines/en (last visited Apr. 10, 2016). The 
importance of essential medicines is underscored by the fact that they are designated as core—
and hence prioritized—obligations under the right to health. See General Comment No. 14, 
supra note 4, ¶ 12. 
 9.  See U.N. MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOAL GAP TASK FORCE, MDG GAP TASK 
FORCE REPORT 2014: THE STATE OF THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR DEVELOPMENT, at 53–59, 
U.N. Sales No. E.14.I.7 (2014), 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/mdg_gap/mdg_gap2014/2014GAP_FULL_E
N.pdf [hereinafter MDG Gap Task Force Report 2014]; U.N. MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT 
GOAL GAP TASK FORCE, MDG GAP TASK FORCE REPORT 2015: TAKING STOCK OF THE GLOBAL 
PARTNERSHIP FOR DEVELOPMent, at 53–58, U.N. Sales No. E.15.I.5 (2015), 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/mdg_gap/mdg_gap2015/2015GAP_FULLR
EPORT_EN.pdf [hereinafter MDG Gap Task Force Report 2015]. 
 10.  MDG GAP TASK FORCE REPORT 2014, supra note 9, at 53. 
 11.  MDG GAP TASK FORCE REPORT 2015, supra note 9, at 58. 
 12.  See WHO, supra note 8, at 4–5. 
 13.  Id. at 4. 
 14.  WHO, THE WORLD MEDICINES SITUATION 2011: MEDICINE PRICES, AVAILABILITY 
AND AFFORDABILITY, WHO Doc. WHO/EMP/MIE/2011.2.1 (2011); Laurens M. Niëns et al., 
Quantifying the Impoverishing Effects of Purchasing Medicines: A Cross-Country 
Comparison of the Affordability of Medicines in the Developing World, 7 PLOS MED., Aug. 
31, 2010, at 6–7, 
http://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article/asset?id=10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1000333.PD
F. 
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choices: between food and no health care, or health care and 
impoverishment. To the extent that access to essential medicines is a 
core obligation of states under the right to health, the inaccessibility of 
such medicines would constitute a prima facie violation of the right to 
health. 
The issue of affordability came to prominence around 
inaccessible antiretroviral medicines (ARVs) for HIV/AIDS,15 with 
early access campaigns focused on drugs for infectious diseases such 
as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria.16 While infectious diseases 
are a pressing problem in low- and middle-income countries, the need 
for accessible drugs to treat noncommunicable diseases is no less great, 
especially as developing countries increasingly shoulder the “double 
burden” of communicable and noncommunicable diseases.17 Yet many 
essential medicines for both communicable and noncommunicable 
disease remain unaffordable. For example, a 2010 study found that 
drugs for asthma, diabetes, hypertension, and adult respiratory 
infection in sixteen low- and middle-income countries were so 
unaffordable as to be impoverishing.18 Moreover the early focus on 
infectious disease remains narrow: as a prominent example, medicines 
for hepatitis C remain unaffordable, resulting in very low treatment 
rates in low-income countries where prevalence may be highest.19 
These examples underscore the need for affordable medicines across 
the health domains, and not simply in relation to prominent infectious 
diseases. 
II.  TRIPS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS   
Generic medicines policies are broadly recognized as a key policy 
intervention to control health budgets and make medicines more 
 
 15.  See Ellen ‘t Hoen et al., Driving a Decade of Change: HIV/AIDS, Patents and Access 
to Medicines for All, 14 J. INT’L AIDS SOC’Y, Mar. 27, 2011, at 1–2, 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3078828/pdf/1758-2652-14-15.pdf. ARVs 
for HIV/AIDS were priced at approximately USD $10–15,000 per person per annum, a 
prohibitive cost in low- and middle-income countries where the vast majority of people with 
HIV/AIDS live. Id. at 1. 
 16.  See generally Lisa Forman et al., Human Rights and Global Health Funding: What 
Contribution Can the Right to Health Make to Sustaining and Extending International 




 17.  I. C. Bygbjerg, Double Burden of Noncommunicable and Infectious Diseases in 
Developing Countries, 337 SCIENCE 1499 (2012). 
 18.  Niëns, supra note 14, at 5. 
 19.  See MDG GAP TASK FORCE REPORT 2015, supra note 9, at 61. 
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affordable.20 Yet the policy space for countries to provide affordable 
medicines is bound sometimes wholesale by trade rules around 
intellectual property rights. The introduction in 1995 of the TRIPS 
Agreement required countries acceding to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) to give patent protection to pharmaceuticals, 
something that around 50 countries had not done previously.21 Even in 
countries providing patents, the requirement of 20-year patents 
conferring exclusive rights to prevent nonconsensual use was 
unprecedented. The introduction of patents of this nature resulted in 
monopolistic pricing that saw sometimes dramatic increases in drug 
prices, as in Malaysia where drug prices increased by 28 percent per 
year between 1996 and 2005.22  
TRIPS has flexibilities to give governments policy space to meet 
public health and social welfare imperatives. These include delaying 
the onset of the agreement for the least developed countries (LDC); 
tailoring patent criteria or excluding patents for inventions to protect 
health and life; and permitting countries to manufacture or import 
generic versions of patented drugs or import cheaper versions of 
patented drugs under measures like compulsory licenses and parallel 
imports (albeit strictly limited).23 Global debates focus on these 
flexibilities because they allow policymakers to ensure that high prices 
resulting from exclusive patenting rights do not negatively impact 
public health imperatives. Pharmaceutical companies countered that 
use of these mechanisms in low and middle incomes countries 
negatively impacts their incentives to continue producing new 
medicines,24 an argument decisively countered in the 2006 report of the 
 
 20.  WHO, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION [WIPO] & WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION [WTO], PROMOTING ACCESS TO MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES AND INNOVATION: 
INTERSECTIONS BETWEEN PUBLIC HEALTH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRADE, at 156 
(2012), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/pamtiwhowipowtoweb13_e.pdf. 
 21.  Sandra Bartelt, Compulsory Licenses Pursuant to TRIPS Article 31 in the Light of the 
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 6 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 283, 
285 (2003). 
 22.  Richard D. Smith, Carlos Correa & Cecilia Oh, Trade, TRIPS and Pharmaceuticals, 
373 LANCET 684, 689 (2009). 
 23.  See generally TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 6, 30, 31, 41, 65. Parallel 
importing allows countries to import cheaper versions of patented medicines. Compulsory 
licensing allows governments to manufacture generic versions of patented medicines without 
corporate consent during national emergencies or other circumstances of extreme urgency, for 
public non-commercial use, or where usage is intended to remedy a practice determined after 
judicial or administrative processes to be anti-competitive. See The Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WHO, 
http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/doha_declaration/en (last visited May 13, 2016). 
 24.  See, e.g., The TRIPS Agreement and Pharmaceuticals: Report of an ASEAN 
Workshop on the TRIPs Agreement and its Impact on Pharmaceuticals, at 12–17 (2000), 
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/h1459e/h1459e.pdf. 
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WHO Commission on Intellectual Property, Innovation and Health 
[CIPIH Report] which held that where “the market has very limited 
purchasing power, as is the case for diseases affecting millions of poor 
people in developing countries, patents are not a relevant factor or 
effective in stimulating R&D and bringing new products to market.”25 
Yet global debates focus on TRIPS flexibilities because their use 
continues to attract staunch opposition from companies and their host 
governments in the form of litigation, drug removals, trade sanctions, 
and diplomatic pressures.26 More or less at the same time, regional and 
bilateral FTAs are restricting TRIPS flexibilities in ways that extend 
monopoly pricing and limit market entry for generic medicines with 
stark impacts on affordability. For example, “TRIPS-plus rules,” so 
called because they exceed the standards in the TRIPS agreement, 
restrict the grounds on which compulsory licenses can be issued; 
prohibit parallel imports; restrict autonomy to decide patent criteria; 
limit patent exclusions; limit market approval for generic drugs; extend 
data exclusivity requirements and patent terms; and enable “ever-
greening” provisions (the practice of taking out new patents on existing 
medicines in order to maintain monopolies).27 
The price impacts on medicines can be stark: in 2007, Oxfam 
found that after its introduction the US-Jordan FTA resulted in a 20 
percent increase in drug prices.28 Trade-related intellectual property 
rights have therefore discernibly increased medicine prices in many 
low- and middle-income countries and considerably reduced policy 
space to respond to these restrictions. 
III.  THE DOHA DECLARATION AND THE ‘PARAGRAPH 6’ SYSTEM 
The impact of trade-related intellectual property rights on access 
to medicines came most prominently to public attention in 2001 when 
activist and media attention focused on corporate litigation in South 
Africa, which aimed to prevent the government from passing 
 
 25.  WHO COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC 
HEALTH, PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, at 22 (2006), 
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/documents/thereport/ENPublicHealthReport.pdf. 
 26.  See Lisa Forman, Trade Rules, Intellectual Property and the Right to Health, 21 
ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 337 (2007). 
 27.  Lisa Forman & Gillian MacNaughton, Moving Theory into Practice with Human 
Rights Impact Assessment of Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, 7 J. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 
109, 114 (2015). 
 28.  See OXFAM INT’L, ALL COSTS, NO BENEFITS: HOW TRIPS-PLUS INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RULES IN THE US-JORDAN FTA AFFECT ACCESS TO MEDICINES 2 (2007), 
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/all%20costs,%20no%20benefits.pdf. 
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affordable medicines legislation despite the fact millions were dying 
annually from lack of access to medicines for diseases like 
HIV/AIDS.29 This caused a tremendous public outcry and contributed 
to enabling African countries at the Doha round of WTO negotiations 
to push through the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health to give legal clarity to states’ use of these flexibilities.30 
The Doha Declaration explicitly endorsed the right of WTO members 
to protect public health and promote access to medicines for all and to 
use TRIPS flexibilities to the fullest to do so.31 It specified that these 
flexibilities included the right to grant compulsory licenses and to use 
parallel importing.32 It also asked the TRIPS council to find a solution 
to the inability of WTO members with insufficient or no manufacturing 
capacity to effectively use compulsory licensing and to extend the 
LDC waiver from applying TRIPS to pharmaceuticals to 2016.33 
This request prompted the development of the “Paragraph 6 
System,” so called because of its location within the Doha Declaration. 
The system aimed to enable countries to export drugs to LDC without 
domestic manufacturing capacity, since TRIPS restricts the use of 
compulsory licenses to supplying the domestic market, leaving 
countries without domestic manufacturing capacity without a means to 
export generic pharmaceuticals made elsewhere. In 2005, the TRIPS 
Council proposed to incorporate the system as a permanent TRIPS 
amendment when it was accepted by two-thirds of WTO members 
(with a deadline of 2007 extended to December 31, 2015, in 2013, and 
then to December 2017 in 2015).34  
However the system has been used only once, when in 2007, a 
Canadian generic manufacturer exported ARVs to Rwanda.35 The cost 
and complexity of the Canadian experience suggest why the Paragraph 
 
 29.  See Lisa Forman, “Rights” and Wrongs: What Utility for the Right to Health in 
Reforming Trade Rules on Medicines?, 10 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 37, 43–45 (2008). 
 30.  See Ellen ‘t Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to Essential 
Medicines: A Long Way from Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 27, 38–42 (2002). 
 31.  WTO, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, ¶ 4, WTO Doc. 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. 
 32.  Id. ¶ 5.b. 
 33.  Id. ¶¶ 6, 7. 
 34.  See General Council Decision, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement – Fifth 
Extension of the Period for the Acceptance by Members of the Protocol Amending the TRIPS 
Agreement, WTO Doc. WT/L/965 (Dec. 2, 2015). 
 35.  See Richard Elliott, Managing the Market for Medicines Access: Realizing the Right 
to Health by Facilitating Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals—A Case Study of 
Legislation and the Need for Reform, in ACCESS TO MEDICINES AS A HUMAN RIGHT: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY RESPONSIBILITY 151, 156–57 (Lisa Forman & 
Jillian Clare Kohler eds., 2012). 
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6 System is used so infrequently: over six years, the manufacturer 
made two drug shipments and declined to renew the license,36 and 
industry opposition saw legislative efforts to streamline the process 
voted down twice in parliament.37 
Another reason countries are not using the system is because they 
are buying from countries that do not need to issue compulsory 
licenses, like India, which Ghana did in 2005 instead of importing from 
Canada where the drugs were patented.38 That India’s role in providing 
access to affordable generics is of crucial importance globally is shown 
clearly with ARVs, the greatest success of the global access 
campaigns. Of the 13.6 million people accessing ARVs in 2014,39 it is 
estimated that 80 percent are dependent on Indian generics to do so.40 
India has this generic manufacturing capacity because it took full 
advantage of the transition periods in TRIPS that all low- and middle-
income countries have when acceding to it.  
However the introduction in 2005 of pharmaceutical patents 
means India will no longer be able to supply generics of newer ARVs 
and other drugs other than through the use of TRIPS flexibilities. The 
Indian Government has incorporated these flexibilities into law, 
including by curtailing “ever-greening” by refusing patents if 
companies cannot show clear novelty or efficacy.41 The Indian 
Government used this flexibility when it denied a patent to Novartis 
on a new formulation of Gleevec, a blood cancer drug, which it 
contended lacked novelty. This decision was upheld in 2013 by the 
Supreme Court of India.42 While the Doha Declaration is explicit that 
 
 36.  See, e.g., APOTEX INC., SUBMISSION TO THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRY, 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: BILL C-393, AN ACT TO AMEND THE PATENT ACT (DRUGS FOR 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES) AND TO MAKE A CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENT TO 
ANOTHER ACT (Oct. 26, 2010), 
http://www.apotex.com/global/docs/submission_order_en.pdf; Gloria Galloway, Tories Block 
Bid to Make Cheaper Medicines for Poor Nations, GLOBE & MAIL (Nov. 28, 2012), 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/tories-block-bid-to-make-cheaper-
medicines-for-poor-nations/article5759286. 
 37.  See Galloway, supra note 36. 
 38.  See WHO, WIPO, & WTO, supra note 20, at 178. 
 39.  JOINT U.N. PROGRAMME on HIV/AIDS, FAST TRACK: ENDING THE AIDS EPIDEMIC BY 
2030, at 7 (2014), 
http://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/media_asset/JC2686_WAD2014report_en.pdf. 
 40.  See Brenda Waning et al., A Lifeline to Treatment: The Role of Indian Generic 
Manufacturers in Supplying Antiretroviral Medicines to Developing Countries, 13 J. INT’L 
AIDS SOC’Y, Sept. 14, 2010, at 3, 5, 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2944814/pdf/1758-2652-13-35.pdf. 
 41.  See Patralekha Chatterjee, India’s Patent Case Victory Rattles Big Pharma, 381 
LANCET 1263 (2013). 
 42.  Novartis AG v. Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 1 (India). 
FORMANFINALBOOKPROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2017  2:55 PM 
16 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 31:8 
states can use flexibilities like compulsory licenses to ensure access to 
medicines, India has faced corporate litigation over patent denials,43 
and a full range of U.S. diplomatic and trade pressures, with worrying 
signs that these might be prompting intellectual property policy 
reform.44 These kinds of reforms may threaten India’s central role as 
supplier of generic medicines to much of the developing world. 
IV.  UNITED NATIONS RESPONSES TO TRADE-RELATED INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS  
The U.N. system’s policy response to the affordability of 
medicines has been mixed. Access to medicines was first included as 
an objective in the original MDGs largely because of immense social 
pressures, which turned the issue into a focal point for political actors.45 
However, its location and formulation in the text of the MDGs reflects 
an institutional mindset at the time of its drafting that was very 
reluctant to upset the political and commercial interests at stake. For 
example, MDG 8.e aims to provide access to affordable essential drugs 
in developing countries in cooperation with pharmaceutical 
companies,46 an approach that seemed to preclude ostensibly 
“uncooperative” measures like compulsory licenses. While the 
inclusion of this goal in the MDGs brought global access to medicines 
within the scope of annual progress monitoring of the MDGs, the goal 
failed to quantify a target or timeframe and did not speak of TRIPS 
flexibilities even in general. This response took at face value corporate 
arguments that strict intellectual property rights in developing 
countries were critical to protect the innovation cycle that produced 
new medicines.47 However, studies and reports since then confirm that 
patents in developing countries do not stimulate research and 
 
 43.  See, e.g., Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, Order No. 45/2013 (Intellectual Property 
Appellate Board, Chennai, 2013). 
 44.  See, e.g., Ben Wolfgang, Modi Pressed to Address Intellectual Property Reforms, 
WASH. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/sep/29/indias-
narendra-modi-pressed-to-address-intellectu. 
 45.  For example, the analysis of how activist mobilization around corporate litigation to 
prevent the South African government from adopting an affordable medicines law influenced 
political responses to HIV/AIDS medicines. See generally Forman, supra note 29. (I forget if 
it’s small caps or not) 
 46.  Goal 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development, supra note 6; G.A. Res. 
55/2, United Nations Millennium Declaration, ¶ 20 (Sept. 18, 2000) (resolving to “encourage 
the pharmaceutical industry to make essential drugs more widely available and affordable by 
all who need them in developing countries”). 
 47.  See, e.g., Henry Grabowski, Patents, Innovation, and Access to New 
Pharmaceuticals, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 849 (2002). 
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development of new medicines.48 The timidity of global policy 
initiatives like the MDGs in naming practices like compulsory licenses 
therefore appears to be misplaced.  
The 2006 CIPIH report prompted the most comprehensive global 
policy response yet in the Global Strategy and Plan of Action on 
Intellectual Property, Innovation and Public Health (GSPA) produced 
by a WHO intergovernmental working group between 2006 and 2008 
and adopted by the World Health Assembly in May 2008.49 The GSPA 
specified over one hundred actions to address medicines access and 
innovation in eight areas, including crucial recognitions regarding 
actions in relation to intellectual property rights. For example, it 
recognized that countries had general authority to use flexibilities 
recognized in the Doha Declaration and that appropriate pricing 
policies should include use of such flexibilities.50 Further, the GSPA 
identifies flexibilities like research exceptions, export to countries with 
no manufacturing capacity, “regulatory exceptions,” and abuse of 
intellectual property rights.51  
However the GSPA also makes no mention of compulsory 
licensing, the flexibility at the heart of these debates and explicitly 
endorsed in the Doha Declaration. Nor does it mention parallel imports 
and restrictions of data-exclusivity to enable generic market entry—
flexibilities in TRIPS that are generally restricted or removed in FTAs 
and whose usage generally prompts legal or economic pressures.52 The 
GSPA also stepped back from explicitly addressing the kinds of 
“TRIPS-plus” rights promulgated in FTAs, with the final strategy 
deleting a section cautioning states not to adopt TRIPS-plus protection 
in bilateral trade agreements in favor of a suggestion that states take 
into account, where appropriate, the impact on public health when 
considering adopting more extensive intellectual property rights than 
in TRIPS.53 While the strategy gives great clarity to action in many 
other places, the failure to identify key flexibilities and common 
practices limiting them suggests a weak commitment to supporting key 
strategies that can impact pricing, and to guarding against political and 
 
 48.  See WHO COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND 
PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 25. 
 49.  See WHO, GLOBAL STRATEGY AND PLAN OF ACTION ON PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION 
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, at 1 (2011), 
http://www.who.int/phi/publications/Global_Strategy_Plan_Action.pdf. 
 50.  World Health Assembly Res. 61/21, ¶¶ 37–38 (May 24, 2008). 
 51.  Id. ¶¶ 30(2.4)(e), 36(5.2)(d), 39(6.3)(a), 39(6.3)(f). 
 52.  See generally Forman & MacNaughton, supra note 27. 
 53.  See World Health Assembly Res. 61/21, supra note 50, ¶ 36(5.2)(b). 
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economic interference in this area. These gaps raise questions about 
whether the current strategy could respond to key domains of drug 
access.  
Certainly global policy has progressed since then, with the 
medicine goal in the Sustainable Development Goals which replace the 
MDGs calling for states to:  
[s]upport the research and development of vaccines and 
medicines for the communicable and non-
communicable diseases that primarily affect 
developing countries, provide access to affordable 
essential medicines and vaccines, in accordance with 
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health, which affirms the right of developing 
countries to use to the full the provisions in the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights regarding flexibilities to protect public 
health, and, in particular, provide access to medicines 
for all.54 
This goal is markedly broader and more ambitious than its 
corollary in the MDGs, encompassing both innovation of new 
medicines and access to existing medicines, incorporating both 
communicable and noncommunicable disease, and explicitly citing the 
Doha Declaration in affirming the right to use TRIPS flexibilities in 
full. A similar proposal is made in the 2016 report of the United 
Nations High Level Panel on Access to Medicines, which recommends 
that “WTO members should commit themselves, at the highest 
possible political levels, to respect the letter and the spirit of the Doha 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, refraining from any action 
that will limit their implementation and use in order to promote access 
to health technologies,”and that this includes “adopt[ing] and 
implement[ing] legislation that facilitates the issuance of compulsory 
licenses.”55 These policy shifts suggest that the global perspective on 
access to medicines have changed considerably since the MDGs were 
formulated in 2001, albeit that specific references to mechanisms like 
 
 54.  Sustainable Development Goals, U.N., 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300 (last visited Apr. 11, 2016). 
55 United Nations. “Report of the United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on 
Access toMedicines: Promoting Innovation and Access to Health Technologies.” 2016, p27-
29. Available online: http://www.unsgaccessmeds.org/final-report/ (accessed on 14 
November 2016) 
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compulsory licensing and parallel imports remain rare. 
V.  THE INADEQUATE OUTCOMES OF GLOBAL POLICY INITIATIVES  
It is troubling then that this thicket of global policy has had almost 
no impact on primary barriers to affordability: TRIPS-plus intellectual 
property rights are not only expanding but are getting stricter, with 
TRIPS flexibilities being limited, and even eradicated, and the global 
movement of generic medicines through international borders being 
continually obstructed under measures to eradicate counterfeit 
medicines.56 TRIPS flexibilities are increasingly the only remaining 
aperture through which state policy for affordable medicines can 
operate and, as indicated above, India, the primary provider of these 
medicines, is being stringently targeted. Global access to affordable 
medicines is more, not less, threatened. 
While the full use of TRIPS flexibilities may be the primary 
solution on the table to resolve the inaccessibility of affordable 
medicines, we should not be fooled into believing that it is anything 
but a poor solution. TRIPS flexibilities turn the fundamental human 
right to health and affordable medicines into a rigidly restricted 
exception to a property right,57 and affordable medicines, the price 
developing countries must pay to enter wealthy markets and the global 
economy. Existing policy proposals do little to mitigate this impact and 
have failed to propose anything more than the most incremental of 
steps. As a case in point, the 2012 U.N. Commission on HIV and the 
Law recommended that WTO members urgently suspend TRIPS for 
essential drugs for low- and middle-income countries, and that the 
U.N. Secretary General convene a new body to recommend a new 
intellectual property regime for drugs.58 The U.N. Secretary-General’s 
High-Level Panel on Access to Medicines was set up in response, and 
offered an important testing ground for promoting an intellectual 
property system that didn’t simply enhance protection of the public 
interest as an externality to its ethos of advancing trade interests, but 
that located this system within the broader system of international law 
 
 56.  See, e.g., Kaitlin Mara, India May Be Nearing Dispute Settlement with EU over 
Generic Drug Seizures, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Aug. 28, 2009), http://www.ip-
watch.org/2009/08/28/india-may-be-nearing-dispute-settlement-with-eu-over-generic-drug-
seizures. 
 57.  See Philippe Cullet, Patents and Medicines: The Relationship Between TRIPS and 
the Human Right to Health, 79 INT’L AFFAIRS 139 (2003). 
 58.  See U.N. GLOBAL COMMISSION ON HIV AND THE LAW, RISK, RIGHTS & HEALTH (July 
2012), http://www.hivlawcommission.org/resources/report/FinalReport-
Risks,Rights&Health-EN.pdf. 
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that recognizes that the “common good of humankind [is] not reducible 
to the good of any particular institution or ‘regime.’”59 Yet the Panel’s 
report did little to move beyond prior policy proposals in this area, 
losing an important opportunity to progress beyond the status quo on 
access to medicines.60 
Finally, it is worth noting that transformation in this area has 
always come from social actors who brought the full weight of human 
rights law and social pressures to bear on naming, shaming, and 
prodding appropriate action from international institutions, companies, 
and their supporting government in relation to AIDS treatment.61 Their 
successes underscore that the global drug gap is created and reinforced 
by human decisions and action and can accordingly be undone by 
human decisions and action.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Access to medicines in low- and middle-income countries 
globally has been negatively impacted by trade-related intellectual 
property rights in a range of fora. Global policy initiatives have failed 
to respond appropriately to the restrictive impact of these rights. If the 
global drug gap is to be remediated, bold and decisive action at the 
global level must replace the business as usual response that has 
characterized global policy initiatives to date. In the current political 
climate of a new U.S. administration, the boldness of action that we 
may see is highly unlikely to move in the direction of equity and 
fairness in access to medicines. 
 
 
 59.  Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from 
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, ¶ 480, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 
13, 2006).  
60 See Lisa Forman, Ifrah Abdillahi, and Jeannie Samuel, “Assessing the UN High-
Level Report on Access to Medicines Report in Light of the Right to health,” 
(2016) 5 LAWS 1-11, at 8. 
 61.  See Mark Heywood & Dennis Altman, Confronting AIDS: Human Rights, Law, and 
Social Transformation, 5 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 149 (2000). 
